The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker [Econometrica 60 (1992) 
Introduction
We consider cost sharing problems with a single good. Each agent in a group demands a non-negative amount and the total cost of supplying the aggregate demand is speci…ed by a cost function. A cost sharing rule assigns shares of the total cost to each agent.
Two cost sharing rules have received considerable attention due to their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties; the increasing and decreasing serial rules (see, e.g., Shenker 1992, 1994 (1992) and Moulin (1996) in terms of the strategic properties of the induced cost sharing game. Moulin and Shenker (1994) provides an axiomatic characterization.
According to the decreasing serial rule (de Frutos 1998) each agent's cost share is determined by his own demand and the demands of those other agents who have the same or a larger demand. This rule seems particularly appropriate in a situation where the cost function is concave; in fact it only guarantees non-negative cost shares in this case. In de Frutos This paper provides such an axiomatic characterization of the decreasing serial rule. To facilitate meaningful comparisons, and in an attempt to develop a uni…ed approach, it has been our aim to obtain an axiomatic characterization which parallels that given by Moulin and Shenker (1994) where the increasing serial rule is characterized by the axioms of Separable Costs and Additivity (see Section 3) and a sort of a consistency axiom called Free Lunch which is discussed in Section 4. But while there are clear similarities between the increasing and decreasing serial rules (and their axiomatic characterizations) there are also some important di¤erences.
Indeed, for reasons that we shall explain later, for the decreasing serial rule there appears to be no direct counterpart to the Free Lunch axiom of the Moulin-Shenker characterization.
De…nitions
Let C : R + ! R + be a non-decreasing cost function with C(0) = 0, and let N = f1; :::; ng be a …nite set of agents. Demands are given by a vector q 2 R N + , where q i denotes agent i's demand. We assume that agents are numbered such that q 1 q n .
The triple (N; C; q) constitutes a cost sharing problem. Given (N; C; q), a cost allocation is a vector x in R N such that
cost sharing rule is a function that to each cost sharing problem (N; C; q) assigns a cost allocation x = (N; C; q); where x i = i (N; C; q) is the cost share of agent i 2 N .
Given a cost sharing problem (N; C; q); we de…ne r 0 = 0; r 1 = nq 1 ; r 2 = q 1 + (n 1)q 2 and r i = q 1 + ::: + q i 1 + (n + 1 i)q i for i = 3; ::; n, and s 0 = 0; s 1 = nq n ; s 2 = q n +(n 1)q n 1 and s i = q n +:::+q n+2 i +(n+1 i)q n+1 i , for i = 3; :::; n. Note that r 1 r n = q 1 + ::: + q n = s n s 1 . The increasing serial rule Shenker 1992, 1994 ) is de…ned by
The decreasing serial rule (de Frutos 1998) is de…ned by
We say that a cost sharing rule is continuous if whenever C k converges pointwise to C; then i (N; C k ; q) converges to i (N; C; q); for all N; i, and q.
A cost sharing rule is order-preserving if 1 (N; C; q) n (N; C; q) whenever q 1 q n . Continuity and order-preservation are standard regularity conditions, and in the following we restrict attention to cost sharing rules satisfying both conditions.
An axiomatic characterization
Our characterization combines two well-known properties with a third property that is new but in a sense related to the Free Lunch axiom in Moulin and Shenker (1994).
Let C denote the linear function for which C(z) = z for all z 0.
Separable Costs states that in case of a linear cost function all agents pay the constant average cost for all units demanded. Since the increasing and decreasing serial rules coincide on linear cost functions both rules satisfy Separable Costs.
Additivity states that the cost shares are independent of whether any two cost sharing problems are resolved together or separately. It is satis…ed by both the increasing and decreasing serial rule.
For the third axiom we make use of the following de…nitions: For z 2 R, de…ne (z) + = maxf0; zg: For t 2 R + ; let t (z) = minfz; tg be the plateau cost function where total cost is equal to total demand until a plateau level t is reached and the total cost then remains …xed. For S N , q S is the projection of q on R S .
Axiom 3 (Plateau Cost). If C = t and nq n t, then n (N; t ; q) = t=n
This axiom states that if C is a plateau cost function with plateau level t, the agent with the highest demand pays an equal share of the plateau cost t if the total demand would exceed t in the case that all agents demanded the same quantity as the agent with the highest demand. This might seem reasonable considering that average costs are decreasing and the group as a whole bene…ts from a large total demand. Now, having settled the cost share of the agent with the highest demand, this agent may now be removed from the set of agents and the cost shares of the remaining agents can be speci…ed by imposing the same cost sharing rule on an adjusted cost function and adding a constant. The plateau level of the cost function is adjusted for the size of the highest demand, and a constant is added in order to ensure budget balance, i.e. to adjust for di¤erences between the size of the demand and the size of the cost share of the agent with the highest demand. Note that if the demand of agent n alone is above the plateau t then all agents share the …xed cost equally. The axiom is silent in cases where nq n < t.
It is easy to see that Plateau Cost is violated by increasing serial cost sharing: For example, let C = t and let q = (0; t). Then according to the increasing serial rule , for a precise statement). Lemma 1 in the appendix speci…es how the decreasing serial rule generally works on plateau cost functions.
We shall now state the main result. for all j = 1; : : : ; n (since s k t for k = 1; : : : ; n).
If s n < t, then, for j = i; : : : ; n we have
since t (s k ) = t for k = 1; : : : ; n + 1 i: Moreover, for agent i 1 by (2) we
For j = 1; : : : ; i 2 by (2) we have
since t (s k ) = s k for k = n + 2 i; : : : ; n + 1 j.
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 1: First we show, in …ve steps, that the decreasing serial rule is the only rule (if any) that can be consistent with Axioms 1-3. The sixth and last step veri…es that the decreasing serial rule is, in fact, consistent with the axioms.
Step 1: By Axioms 1-3 we get that n (N; nqn ; q) = n (N; C 1 ; q) n (N; nqn ; q) = q n (nq n )=n = 0: De…ne t (z) = (z t) + . By order-preservation, i (N; nqn ; q) 0, for i = 1; : : : ; n 1: Now, since P n i=1 i (N; nqn ; q) = 0 we have i (N; nqn ; q) = 0, for all i. Thus, by Axioms 1 and 2
for all i.
Now, add a new agent n + 1 with q n+1 q n and let N = N [ fn + 1g: By Axiom 3, n+1 ( N ; (n+1)q n+1 ; (q; q n+1 )) = q n+1 and by the above argument i ( N ; (n+1)q n+1 ; (q; q n+1 )) = q i for all i n:
Using Axiom 3 we remove the new agent again and obtain i ( N ; (n+1)q n+1 ; (q; q n+1 )) = i (N; nq n+1 ; q) + 0 = q i ;
for i n. This, in turn, determines i (N; t ; q) for large t:
for all i and all t nq n = s 1 . Thus, for t s 1 , (N; t ; q) = D (N; t ; q)
by Lemma 1. In the remainder of the proof we assume that t < s 1 .
Step 2: By Axiom 3 we have n (N; t ; q) = t=n and for i 6 = n i (N; t ; q) = i (N nfng; (t qn) + ; q N nfng ) + q n (q n t) + t=n n 1 :
If q n t then by Axiom 3 (and using continuity for the special case q n = t) we have i (N; t ; q) = t=n for all i 6 = n. Thus, for t < s 1 and q n t; (N; t ; q) = D (N; t ; q): In the remainder of the proof we assume that q n < t:
Step 3: By Axiom 3 we have i (N; t ; q) = i (N nfng; t qn ; q N nfng ) + q n t=n n 1 ; for i 6 = n:
Consider the agent with the second largest demand q n 1 : If s 2 t then (by the arguments above) we have i (N nfng; t qn ; q N nfng ) = q i ;
for all i = 1; : : : ; n 1; and consequently i (N; t ; q) = q i + qn t=n n 1 for i 6 = n. Hence, for s 2 t < s 1 and t > q n ; (N; t ; q) = D (N; t ; q): In the remainder of the proof we assume that s 2 > t.
By Axiom 3, n 1 (N nfng; t qn ; q N nfng ) = t qn n 1 which implies n 1 (N; t ; q) = t qn n 1 + qn t=n n 1 = t=n; and thus for q n < t < s 2 we have n 1 (N; t ; q) = D n 1 (N; t ; q) by Lemma 1.
Step 4: Now, consider an arbitrary i n 2, and suppose that j (N; t ; q) = D j (N; t ; q) for all j = i + 1; :::; n. We will show that i (N; t ; q) = D i (N; t ; q): For this, we consider two separate cases: i) t P n j=i+1 q j 0,
and ii) t P n j=i+1 q j < 0.
Case i). Repeated use of Axiom 3 gives us
i (N; t ; q) = i (N nfi + 1; :::; ng; t P n j=i+1 q j ; q N nfi+1;:::;ng ) + q n t=n n 1 + q n 1 t qn n 1 n 2 + :::
:::; ng; t P n j=i+1 q j ; q N nfi+1;:::;ng )
If s n+1 i t, then by Axiom 3 we get i (N nfi + 1; :::; ng; (t P n j=i+1 q j ) + ; q N nfi+1;:::;ng ) = t P n k=i+1 q k i ;
If s n+1 i < t then by Step 1 we have i (N nfi + 1; :::; ng; t P n j=i+1 q j ; q N nfi+1;:::;ng ) = q i and consequently
Using Lemma 1, we can therefore conclude that i ( t ; q) = D i ( t ; q) if t P n j=i+1 q j 0 and t < s 2 :
Case ii). By Lemma 1, we have P n i=1 i (N; t ) = t) we get j (N; t ; q) = t n for all j < i + 1: Using Lemma 1 we conclude that
We conclude that (N; t ) = D (N; t ).
Step 5: By Axiom 1 and 2, and Lemma 1 in Moulin and Shenker (1994),
we have that (C; q) = D (C; q) for any function C that can be written as the di¤erence between two non-decreasing convex functions, and C(0) = 0. By continuity, Axiom 2, and Remark 2 in Moulin and Shenker (1994) we conclude that (N; C; q) = D (N; C; q) for an arbitrary non-decreasing function C.
Step 6: Lastly, we need to show the decreasing serial cost sharing rule is, in fact, consistent with Axioms 1-3 . It is well-known (or readily veri…ed) that D satis…es Axioms 1 and 2, so we focus on Axiom 3. Let s 1 t then according to (2) we get D n (N; t ; q) = t (s 1 ) n = t n ;
hence the decreasing serial cost sharing rule satis…es the …rst part of Axiom 3. Now, if q n t then s k t for all k = 1; : : : ; n and consequently Now consider an arbitrary j 2 f1; : : : ; n 2g: Then 
